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COAL MINING A PUBLIC UTILITY
By FRANK A. WACHOB of the Denver Bar
HETHER N.R. A. is alive or dead,
whether the
Colorado Industrial Recovery Act, sometimes known
as Senate Bill 171, is constitutional or unconstitutional, whether or not the Guffey Bill is enacted, the fact remains that the coal mining industry within the State is rapidly
degenerating into a chaotic condition.
This was one industry that benefited materially under
N. R. A. and its codes. This is true nationally as well as
within the State. That the coal operators recognize the
demise of N. R. A. seems apparent, inasmuch as the Code
Authorities, including Division 5 and the District' code
groups thereunder, are being rapidly liquidated. In lieu of
the N. R. A. Codes some of the districts within the State have
submitted a draft of a new code to the Colorado Industrial
Recovery Board.
However, action under the codes will
doubtless be suspended pending a decision of the State Supreme Court as to the constitutionality of the State Recovery
Act.
All codes, whether voluntary or forced, depend upon
two things for their ultimate success, i. e., first, control of
production, and second, control of selling prices. Both elements must be controlled for the entire industry, otherwise
the code or monopoly set up under the code can be broken
down and its effectiveness destroyed by a minority of those
engaged in the industry.
With the dissolution of the N. R. A. codes and the
return to previous competitive conditions, the gains made
under the codes are rapidly being lost, due to the fact that in
recent months new mines have been brought into production
and the production from the old mines has been increased to
some extent. In order to move this increased production,
prices are being slashed and many of the evils attendant on
267
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price reductions are again creeping into the industry. The
operators are finding that they cannot meet their payrolls on
this decreased revenue, and it is only natural to expect that
within a short time, unless something is done to restore conditions which have obtained during the past two years, the
operators will attempt to reduce their production expense by
increasing the hours of labor or by cutting wages, probably
both. If continued to any length this will precipitate serious
labor troubles. Colorado's history is replete with coal
strikes, and no one wishes to experience a repetition of those
useless struggles where the laborers always suffer disastrous
losses, the operators come out of the strike bankrupt, and the
citizens of the State are taxed for years to come to pay the
costs incident to the strike.
Since the lack of control in production, or in this instance, the mining of coal, seems to be the crux of the problem,
it would seem advisable to evolve some State agency to exercise the police power of the State and to control production.
That coal mining is intrastate and not interstate commerce
seems incontrovertible in view of the holding of the United
States Supreme Court in the case of United Mine Workers of
America v. Coronado Coal Co., 259 U. S. 345, wherein the
court said:
"Coal mining is not interstate commerce and the power of Congress does not extend to its regulation."

Also to the same effect are Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U. S.
251, and Delaware L. t4 W. R. R. Co. v. Yurkonis, 238 U. S.
439.
Being an intrastate business and subject to the police
power of the State, is any regulation possible under existing
laws, and if so, to what extent do they provide for regulation?
In 1913 the General Assembly passed Senate Bill No. 1,
being Chapter 46, C. L. 1921. Section 2913 of the statute,
in defining the jurisdiction of the Commission, declares:
"*
* * and every corporation, or person now or hereafter declared by law to be affected with a public interest, and each thereof, is
hereby declared to be a public utility and to be subject to the jurisdic-
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tion, control and regulation of the Commission and to the provisions of
this Act'."

In 1922, in the case of People v. United Mine Workers
of America, 70 Colo. 269, the Supreme Court said:
"*

*

* unless coal mining may be said to be affected with a

public interest its regulation by statute to the extent attempted by said
chapter is unconstitutional, see cases cited below. The words 'affected
with a public interest' were no doubt used by the General Assembly to
keep the statute within constitutional limits. It becomes necessary then,
not only in order to construe the statute but to decide whether it is
constitutional, to determine whether coal mining is so affected, and it
seems self-evident that it is. * * *

"There can be no question that the production of coal is at present
time affected with a public interest, to a certainty and an extent not less
than any other industry."

Thus having been declared by the courts of this State to be an
industry affected with a public interest, it seems self-evident
that it comes within the purview of the State Public Utilities
Act, and is subject to the jurisdiction of the Colorado Public
Utilities Commission.
As pointed out above, over-production of coal is the
prime evil in the industry. This over-production brings
about price cuts, rebates, discrimination, short weights, misbranding, wage cuts, and all of the other evils that have always attended the industry. Section 2946 of the Utilities
Act provides:
"No public utility shall henceforth begin the construction of a
new facility, plant or system or of any extension of its facility, plant or
system without first having obtained from the Commission a certificate
that the present or future public convenience and necessity requires or
will require such construction," etc.
It would seem that by requiring this certificate of convenience
and necessity for new construction of mines (plants, facilities

or systems) or extension thereof, the coal resources of the
State can be advantageously conserved and the wholesale
waste and destruction thereof prevented.
Section 2924 of the Act requires that all charges made,
demanded or received by any public utility for any rate, fare,
product or commodity furnished or to be furnished, etc., shall
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be just and reasonable. Section 2925 of the Act provides that
the Commission shall regulate rates and correct abuses. Section 2926 provides that the utility shall file a schedule of its
rates, terms, rentals, charges and classifications, etc., and that
the same cannot be changed except on thirty days' notice,
unless the Commission orders otherwise. Section 2929 of the
Act prohibits the granting of preferences, rebates and advantages and would eliminate a number of those evils which the
codes have tried to remove.
By reason of the various provisions of the Act relative
to supervision and inspection, it may be possible as well as
advisable to consolidate the office of State Coal Mine Inspector
with that of the Public Utilities Commission, making the
office of the Inspector a department of the Commission.
The enforcing provisions of the Act are set forth in
Section 2970. These penal provisions seem sufficient to insure
compliance with the Act and certainly provide a more effective
means of enforcement than those provided in the codes.
Those who are familiar with the coal mining industry
may see certain disadvantages that will result to the industry
by such regulation. However, in view of all parties concerned, including the general public for once, it would seem
that the advantages far outnumber the disadvantages. The
industry itself should not fear regulation of this character, as
it has voluntarily submitted to regulation under the codes and
has generally profited thereby. Regulation under the Utilities
Act would merely take the place of that lost by reason of the
abandonment of the codes, and would have an additional protection not provided in the codes, namely, control of production. I therefore submit that in view of the importance of
the industry to the State, its past history, and the outlook for
its future, regulation is absolutely necessary in the interest of
all concerned. The Supreme Court has found that coal mining is a business affected with a public interest, and as a result
of this finding coal mining is a public utility within the purview of the Public Utilities Act. As it is a public utility and
subject to the provisions of the Act, the Public Utilities Commission should immediately assume jurisdiction of the industry and require compliance with the applicable provisions of
the Colorado Utilities Act.

MINUTES OF A MEETING OF UNLAWFUL PRACTICE
OF LAW COMMITTEE OF DENVER BAR
ASSOCIATION
A meeting of the Ljnlawful Practice of the Law Com-

mittee of the Denver Bar Association was held at the office of
Jacob V. Schaetzel, chairman of the committee, at four
o'clock P. M. on September 17, 1935.
Members of the committee present were: Thomas
Woodrow, John Zanoni, Gail L. Ireland, Jacob V. Schaetzel.

The report of Gail L. Ireland on unauthorized practice
of law before the Justice of the Peace Courts was received.
Mr. Ireland gave a splendid report, and, after hearing it, the
following resolution was unanimously adopted:
"RESOLVED, that proper action be commenced against any
person who unlawfully appears as an attorney in any action commenced before a Justice of the Peace in Denver, Colorado."

Mr. John Zanoni gave a report on the filing of corpora-

tion papers, and stated that the office of the Secretary of State
was being changed around and that it was very difficult to get
the statistics which our committee desires before taking action
on any unauthorized practice. Mr. Zanoni stated that the
Secretary of State has promised to co-operate to the fullest
extent, and also stated that between 85 % and 90 % of the
corporation papers now being filed were not filed by attorneys
and that on account of the lack of knowledge of the law, the
efficiency of the office of the Secretary of State was impaired,
owing to the fact that they had to go over these papers so
very carefully, and the Secretary of State thought it would be
much better if only attorneys prepared these papers.
A brief, general discussion was had as to the preparation
of estate papers by Clerks of the County Court, and other
matters of interest.
The Committee adjourned at 5:30 P. M., to be called
again at the next meeting by the chairman.
JACOB V. SCHAETZEL, Chairman.
271
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MASSACHUSETTS TAKES ACTION TO STOP
UNLAWFUL PRACTICE
(Unauthorized Practice News, Am. Bar Assn., September, 1935)

Attorney General Dever of Massachusetts will prosecute
more than 100 persons, collection agencies, automobile road
service companies and corporations charged with illegal practice of the law, according to a featured story appearing in the
Boston Herald on August 30, 1935. The prosecutions will
be the result of a sweeping two months' investigation under
the direct supervision of Assistant Attorney General Maurice
M. Goldman which revealed, it is alleged, that more than
$1,000,000 annually was being taken from the public by
those practicing law illegally. Furthermore, the investigation
is said to have revealed that for the most part the low-salaried
people were contributing the major part of this annual
tribute.
The effects of this investigation alone have been tremendous, according to the newspaper story.
"Alarmed by the investigation, half the collection agencies of the
state have gone out of business in Massachusetts since the attorneygeneral's investigation began. In the same time, 13 of 25 automobile
road service companies operating in the state have withdrawn from business and others have been sharply warned to cease giving legal advice or
attempting to act in a legal capacity for clients.
"Last January the state supreme court declared that bonding of
collection agencies or anyone else to practice law is unconstitutional.
The Legislature repealed the statute allowing the companies to be
bonded and stipulated that only lawyers and not persons or corporations
may practice law."

Assistant Attorney General Goldman was quoted as
saying:
"Our investigation shows the brazen activities of hundreds of
collection agencies in recent years have been nothing short of amazing.
They have been collecting more than $1,000,000 a year in fake charges
and costs which they have saddled on to the back of debtors, chiefly
among low salaried people.
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"In some instances constables have been working in co-operation
with these racket collection agencies. In other cases they simply hand
a man a badge with which to go out and hound people and scare them
into paying not only their legitimate bills but exorbitant fees.
"All sorts of rackets have been going on, sometimes with the connivance of shyster lawyers in connection with the automobile roadside
service companies. Their proper function is towing disabled automobiles, repairing tires and the like.
"But in recent years they have been offering all sorts of fancy
services, including legal and medical service. For a nominal fee, they
offer not only to provide service on the road but to give legal advice and
free medical treatment in case of injury.
"Some of the road service companies have been used by unscrupulous shyster lawyers as ambulance chasing vehicles. When legal advice
has been sought in accidents, the cases have been turned over in batches
to these ambulance chasers, immeasurably increasing the number of fake
claims which have burdened the courts and insurance companies.
"There is no place in this state for collection agencies and this
department is determined to eliminate them because they have no right
to operate.
"Not only the illegal operations of collection agencies but the unauthorized practice of law by laymen and corporations is going to be
stopped."

The prosecution of these illegal practitioners revealed by
the investigation is scheduled to begin immediately in the Suffolk and Middlesex superior courts.
LOS ANGELES SPEECHES AVAILABLE
The speeches delivered in Los Angeles at the open meeting of the
Committee on Unauthorized Practice of the Law of the American Bar
Association have been mimeographed and are available on request at the
Association headquarters, 1140 North Dearborn Street, Chicago. The
following addresses are included:
(a) Legal Service Rendered by Laymen or Lay Agencies Exclusively to Lawyers.-Andrew D. Christian, Richmond, Virginia.
(b) Practice Before Justices of the Peace and Police Magistrates.
-Burdette B. Webster, Baltimore, Maryland.
(c) Practice of Notaries Public, Real Estate Agents, Real Estate
Brokers and the Like.--John R. Snively, Rockford, Illinois.
(d) Participation by Lawyers in Unlawful Practice of the Law
and Their Discipline for Such Participation.-Stanley B. Houck, Minneapolis, Minnesota.

ENFORCEMENT OF JUSTICE COURT JUDGMENTS
By ROYAL C. RUBRIGHT, of the Denver Bar

NE of the widely used methods of enforcing a judgment of a Justice of the Peace Court is that of filing a
transcript of such judgment in the District Court and
then obtaining an execution on the District Court judgment.
The effectiveness of such a device in collecting such judgments
is seriously limited by the limited number of years, such procedure is available after rendition of the judgment. There
seems to be some question as to exactly how long such a District Court judgment is valid and enforceable.
The decisions of our Supreme Court have shown a
change in the development of the law with respect to Justice
Court judgments filed in the District Court and then made a
basis for execution out of the District Court. The earliest
Colorado case involving this point is the case of Brown v.
Bell, 46 Colo. 163, 103 Pac. 380, 23 L. R. A. (NS) 1096,
133 Am. St. Rep. 54 (1909), wherein the judgment creditor
obtained a Justice Court judgment and filed a transcript in the
District Court within one year thereafter. The judgment
creditor then attempted, at a time which was more than six
years after the Justice Court judgment was rendered, to obtain
execution out of the District Court. The defense was that
the statute of limitations (which is now Section 6492, Compiled Laws 1921) barred such an execution. The court held,
however, that an execution might be issued even though the
six-year statute of limitations had run against an action on
the judgment.
The next case, Sundin v. Frost, 71 Colo. 367, 206 Pac.
1071 (1 922), involved a slightly different set of facts in that
the judgment creditor did not file the transcript of the Justice
Court judgment in the District Court until almost ten years
after the Justice Court judgment had been rendered. He then
sought execution from the District Court. The judgment
debtor brought an action to restrain the enforcement of this
District Court execution. The court enjoined the enforcement
of this execution on the theory that the judgment became dormant and afforded no basis for an action and could not be
made the ground for an execution from the District Court by
274
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filing a transcript of such judgment with the clerk of the District Court. The court distinguished the Brown v. Bell case
on the facts because in the Brown v. Bell case the transcript
was filed in the District Court before six years had elapsed,
while in the instant case the transcript was filed in the District
Court after six years had elapsed.
The problem was definitely settled by the case of Reed v.
Flood, 76 Colo. 139, 230 Pac. 108 (1924), where the facts
were almost identical with the Brown v. Bell case in that the
judgment creditor filed his transcript of the Justice Court
judgment with the clerk of the District Court within three
years after the judgment was rendered and then sought to have
execution issued almost ten years after the Justice Court judgment was rendered. This case presented squarely the problem
of how long a Justice Court judgment was effective for purposes of execution out of the District Court. The court very
definitely held that the Justice Court judgment was effective
for a period of six years after the date of its rendition in the
Justice Court. The holding of this case is to the effect that
the judgment is "dead" after six years have expired and that
no execution could issue on such judgment no matter when
the transcript of such judgment was filed in the District
Court. The court discussed the Brown-Bell and the Sundin
cases and noted that the Sundin case was antagonistic on principle with the Brown-Bell; decided to follow the principle
enunciated in the Sundin case and in effect overruled the decision in the Brown-Bell case.
It may therefore safely be said that the Reed v. Flood
case has definitely established the proposition that an execution cannot issue out of the District Court on a transcript of a
judgment which has been rendered by a Justice Court after
six years have elapsed from the rendition of Justice Court
judgment, and this rule applies no matter when the transcript
of the Justice Court judgment is filed in the District Court
within or after the six years' period.
In addition to granting a right to convert a Justice Court
judgment into a District Court judgment, the statutes (Sec.
254 of the Code-and Sec. 5898, C. L. '21) provide for recording a transcript of the District Court judgment in the
office of the Recorder and thus constituting this recorded
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transcript a lien on all real property of the judgment debtor
for a period of six years.
The case of Davis Bros. Drug Co. v.Counter, 75 Colo.
239, 245 (1924), presented the question as to when the lien
was created. The court in that case held that when a Justice
Court transcript was filed in the District Court and a transcript of the District Court judgment was recorded in the office of the Clerk and Recorder that the six years were computed from the date of rendition of the Justice Court judgment and that the lien did not begin at the time the District
Court judgment was rendered.
Since it is a statute of limitations which bars the enforcement of a District Court judgment-based on a transcript
from the Justice Court, there is the possibility that the running of the statute of limitations may be suspended by absence
of the judgment debtor from the state. In New England
Electric Co. v. Willis Bowes, 89 Colo. 547, 2 P. (2d) 245,
the judgment creditor attempted to secure an execution and
levy on a transcript of a Justice Court judgment which was
filed in the District Court more than nine years after the Justice Court judgment had been rendered. The defense set up
the six-year statute of limitations barred such an execution
and levy. The judgment creditor then contended that under
Sec. 6417, C. L. '21, the operation of the statute of limitations was suspended because the judgment debtor was out of
the state during part of this period. This case presented the
question whether a Justice Court judgment was "dead" after
six years as the court had said in the Reed v. Flood case or
whether the running of the statute of limitations might be
tolled by the absence of the judgment debtor from the state.
The court disposed of the case on the theory that the Act did
not operate retrospectively and the absence of the defendant
began before the statute was passed. However, the court did
intimate that perhaps Section 6417 did not apply to Justice
Court judgments and their transcripts in the District Court
because Section 6417 refers to "causes of action" and not to
"judgments." Some further doubt is cast upon the probable
uses of Section 6417 by the language of the court: "After a
lapse of six years, the Justice Court judgment was dead.
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Thereafter no valid transcript could be filed in the District
Court and no execution issued thereon."
In conclusion it would seem that a transcript of a judgment in a Justice of the Peace Court may be filed in the District Court and then a transcript of such District Court judgment may be recorded in the office of the Recorder as a lien
against the real property of the judgment debtor, such lien
then existing for six years after the date of the rendition of
the judgment in the Justice Court; or an execution may issue
upon the District Court judgment at any time until six years
from the date of the rendition of the judgment in the Justice
Court. There is a very slim possibility that the time during
which an execution might issue out of the District Court
might be extended beyond a six-year period under Section
6417 of the Compiled Laws of 1921 in the event that the
judgment debtor was absent from the state during such time,
but in the light of the unfavorable language of the court in
The New England Electrical Co. v. Bowes, this possibility is
quite slim indeed.
DID YOU KNOW?
A Massachusetts law makes the promotion of a masked ball

illegal?
The laws of Alabama and Vermont empower a husband to chastise his wife, using "a stick no larger than the thumb" (but do not
mention the length of the stick) ?
A Maine law prohibits the wearing of spiked shoes in public?
A New York state law makes it unlawful to feed a sparrow?
A Los Angeles ordinance makes it unlawful for anyone to shoot
at a jackrabbit or a hare from the platform of a trolley car in transit?
A law of the town of Kulpoont, Pa., holds it illegal to keep a

prisoner in jail on Sundays?

MORE ABOUT THE BIG BUFFET DINNER AND
SMOKER
HE SHOW is going over big! It seems that the Buffet
Smoker is just what we have all been waiting for. The
date is set-November 12, 1935, at 6 P. M. at the Denver Athletic Club. The price-as nearly $1.25 as the Committee can make it, as the buffet supper alone is going to be a
wow at $1.
And here is something that has developed further: The
State Bar Association wanted to be invited and your Prexy,
"Bob" Moore, and Committee, thought it was all right to
invite them, so they were invited at the State Bar Association at Colorado Springs, and what's more, from what we
can learn they are about all coming. The Colorado Springs
Bar Association has agreed to donate its show that was given
at the Antlers Luncheon on Saturday noon at the State Bar
meeting, consisting of "Senator Fishface," of Cripple Creek,
who so satisfactorily (that is, to the Republicans) explained
the intricacies of the "New Deal." This act will be worth
the price of admission alone-to the Republicans; and also
the Hill Billies Trio, one of whom was once with the Metropolitan Opera Company, and they are plenty good. The
Pueblo Bar Association also is sending as their amateur representative, Hon. Sam Parlapiano, who plays the flute, and a
couple of professional acts, and other associations are also
sending acts for the professional part of the program.
Now, as to the big news: The amateur program is
going over far beyond the expectations of the Committee.
Just to give you a tip-off on some of the amateur acts, all of
which will be by lawyers in competition for the silver cup
for the best act, for instance, Frank Grant is going to play the
piano and harmonica at the same time. Berton T. Gobble in
a broadcast act that will advertise all the lawyers to such an
extent that "Lucky Strike" and "Pepsodent" will be jealous.
Park Kinney has an act called "The Constitutional Convention of 1935," which will of course have all the prominent
figures of our time, including President Roosevelt, Jim Farley, Herbert Hoovert, et al., and this act also will probably
encourage the Republicans. Otto Friederichs and "Bob"
Moore may repeat their boxing act that was so popular years
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ago. Milton Garwood in a specialty act, Fred Harding has
a pianologue that will delight everybody. Roy 0. Samson
and Elson Whitney will sing, and can they sing?-you will
be the judge.
This isn't half of it as you will know when I tell you
that Irving Hale, John Raines, Arthur Henry, Ed Knowles,
Jack Phelps, Robert Bosworth, Dayton Denious, Ward Bannister, Jean Breitenstein, Francis Knauss and Asel Alexander,
et al., are all co-operating, either with surprise acts or in
helping arrange for them. Enough said for the "Major
Bowes Amateur Hour," except that Joe Mann will be the
accompanist for all the amateurs, and he will bring his girls
with him as dancers, so that there will also be plenty of
feminine pulchritude in the show.
So if you don't come, don't blame me, as the date is far
enough ahead for you to even postpone that Supreme Court
case, as the Supreme Court will all be there in person, and
probably "on the gong," and you will probably be less of an
amateur on this program than you would be in your case
before the Court anyway, and make more of a hit with the
Court. And remember, the Committee has only one idea in
mind-to give you a good time and to get the lawyers better
acquainted, so that hereafter no lawyer will think of another
lawyer except by his first name and as a personal friend.
Selah!
EDWARD V. DUNKLEE,
ChairmanBanquet Committee.
REMEMBER
Price per plate, dinner and entertainment, $1.25.
Stag strictly and entirely.
Important! Make reservations at Chairman Dunklee's office, KE.
7021, as the Denver Athletic Club must have some idea of the number
for which to prepare.
Performers will be given a rehearsal at a date to be announced
later.
After the program is over, the members of the Bar may make
use of the facilities of the club and play cards, chess and checkers,
bowling alleys, pool and billiards, handball courts and swimming pool.
These courtesies will be extended upon being vouched for by a club
member.

MARRIAGE-ANNULMENT--SUFFICIENCY

OF EVIDENCE-James vs.

James-No. 13543-Decided Sept. 30, 1935-Opinion by Mr.
Justice Holland.
Plaintiff below obtained a decree of annulment of common law
marriage with defendant. Defendant below attacked decree on insufficiency of evidence.
1. Evidence sufficient to establish a common law marriage.
2. Actual words of agreement and consent are not always
necessary to establish a common law marriage.
3. All the facts and circumstances evidence a mutual consent
that may be inferred from cohabitation and repute.-Judgment affrmed.
Cady L.
EFFECT OF USURY NOTE Daniels, Inc. vs. Fenton-No. 13500-Decided September 30,
1935-Opinion by Mr. Justice Campbell.
1. Moneylenders' Statute (Sec. 3781 to 3801 C. L. 1921),
with relation to avoiding all contracts for loans less than $300.00
where more than 12% interest is charged, has no application to the
"spreads" between cash and credit sales of second hand automobiles,
when the "spread" is agreed to by both parties, where the down payment is small and the purchaser takes possession.-Judgment reuersed.
CHATTEL MORTGAGE -

TORTS-INJURY TO MINOR BY BONFIRE-VIOLATION OF ORDINANCE

NUISANCE DOCTRINE-Dunbarvs. Olivieri-No.
13485-Decided Sept. 23, 1935-Opinion by-Mr. Justice Bouck.
Dunbar, a minor, brought suit by next friend to recover damages
for personal injuries on two causes of action. First, that the defendant
built a bonfire on a vacant lot during hours other than from 4:00 P. M.
to 8:30 in the evening, in violation of a City ordinance and, second,
on the ground that the fire was an attractive nuisance, likely to attract
children, including the plaintiff. Plaintiff was non-suited below.
1. The mere fact that one does a thing prohibited by Statute
or Ordinance does not render the doer liable for harm unless the intent
of the ordinance is to protect the interest of an individual and the interest invaded is one which the enactment is intended to protect and
the enactment is intended to protect an interest from a particular hazard,
and the invasion of the interest ensues from that hazard and the violation is a legal cause of the invasion.
2. This case does not fall within the class of cases relying upon
the doctrine particularly termed "attractive nuisance." - Judgment
affirmed.
-ATTRACTIVE
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Union Life Insurance Co. vs. Rudolph E. Atschel-No. 13526-Decided September 16, 1935--Opinion by Mr. Justice Holland.
Atschel, Special Agent for Bankers Union Life Insurance Co.,
brought suit below to recover the balance of $1825.93 due on an
agency contract.
He recovered below.
1. Before testimony would be offered by the defendant to show
that by custom and usage in the insurance business, the words "Drawing account" in an agency contract have a peculiar -meaning, the contract itself must be ambiguous; where the contract is free from ambiguity
such evidence of custom and usage is not admissible. - Judgment
affirmed.
CONTRACTS-CONSTRUCTION-USAGE--Bankers

CORPORATIONS--DIRECTORS-DATE TO DISCLOSE-TRUST IMPOSED

WHEN-Colorado and Utah Coal Co. vs. Harris et al.-No.
13289-Decided September 9, 1935--Opinion by Mr. Justice
Burke.
I. Plaintiff sues defendants to impress a trust upon coal lands
standing in the names of the defendants. It appears that the defendant,
Harris, was president of the plaintiff from 1914 until 1927, and con-

tinued as a director until 1929. It was alleged that Harris, prior to
the termination of his official relationship with the plaintiff, secretly
purchased certain coal acreage which he conveyed to a corporation other
than the plaintiff. It is further alleged that the plaintiff had an expectancy in these properties, and that Harris, having obtained the information relative to the value of the properties at the expense of and
while acting in a fiduciary capacity for the plaintiff, holds in trust.
Defendant admitted the purchase of land in question but denies that,
after 1927, he, Harris, had acted actively as a director of the plaintiff
company. He also alleged that the plaintiff company was guilty of a
conspiracy to monopolize the coal business. The trial court found for
the defendants on all matters except that the plaintiff was guilty of a
conspiracy. The assignment of error under consideration reads:
"The court erred in finding that an agent may acquire property
in which his principal has an expectancy; and the court erred further
in finding that plaintiff had no expectance in the property upon which
it seeks to impose a trust."
II. The trial court determined the questions of fact upon evidence which either supports the judgment or is conflicting. Under
those circumstances, the findings of fact will be sustained.
III. In order to establish a trust such as the plaintiff seeks to
impose, evidence thereof must be "clear" "convincing" "certain" "unequivocable" "conclusive."
While Harris had no right to do anything which would cripple or injure his principal, he was not precluded
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from acting for himself in other manners. The evidence disclosed that
the plaintiff company had a prior opportunity to examine and inspect
the property in question.
IV. In such a case, plaintiff is "bound to establish not only that
the properties in question possessed value to it but that it had practical,
and not a mere theoretical, use therefor."--Judgmentaffirmed.

WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION-FINDINGS OF COMMISSION-NOT DISTURBED IF SUPPORTED BY EVIDENCE-The Industrial Commis-

sion of Colorado et al. vs. White-No. 13746-DecidedSeptember
9, 1935--Opinion by Mr. Justice Hilliard.
The claimant's decedent died following an operation for an obstruction caused by looping of the intestine. There was evidence that
this was caused by adhesions from a previous operation; also that it
was due to an accidental fall and strain. The Commission found that
the accident did not cause the obstruction. The District Court held for
the claimant.
1. The Commission is the fact-finding tribunal. The finding
has respectable evidentiary support and is controlling.-Judgment reversed.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-Johnson vs. McDonald-No. 13764-Decided September 9, 1935--Opinion by Mr. Justice Young.
The defendant in error brought an action against the plaintiff in
error for an injunction to enjoin them from carrying out the provisions
of Chapter 181, S. L. 1935, which, with Chapter 124, S. L. 1935,
provided a way for the State of Colorado to procure from the Federal
Government $25,000,000 for a public highway in Colorado.
A general demurrer to the complaint was overruled and defendants
below elected to stand.
1. Courts are concerned with consideration of the power of the
Legislature to act but not with the policy it pursues within those powers.
2. If a statute creates a debt, if it creates a fund to pay it, if
that fund would not be available for general purposes if not used to
pay the debt, the Act is not prohibited by the Constitution.
3. That the law itself declares certain Acts shall be irrepealable,
after contracts shall have been entered into under its authority, is of no
moment, because they become irrepealable whether so declared or not.
4. That interest is paid from a fund upon a warrant drawn on
that fund has never been regarded as a diversion of the fund for purposes other than that for which it is raised.
5. The Act does not delegate non-delegable powers to the Highway Department.-Judgment reversed.
Mr. Justice Campbell, Mr. Justice Bouck and Mr. Justice Hilliard
dissent.
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APPEAL AND ERROR-MOTION TO DISMISS-TIME FILED-Young-

berg vs. The Orlando Canal and Reservoir Co.-No. 13769Decided September 9, 1935--Opinion by Mr. Justice Hilliard.
Defendants in error move to dismiss the writ of error pending in
the Supreme Court on the ground that the record was not lodged in
the court within the time fixed by rule 18, that is to say, within one
year. Suit for a receivership was instituted in 1910. A receiver was
appointed and in July, 1915, pursuant to court order, the assets of
the defendant company. were sold. That sale was properly approved.
Nothing further was done until May, 1933, when plaintiff filed an
amended complaint. In June, 1933, the court ordered that the amended
complaint be stricken. On July 9, 1934, plaintiff again filed an
amended petition for a receiver which was denied and dismissed the
same day. The record was filed in the Supreme Court on July 5,
1935. The court concluded that the final disposition of the cause was
on July 9, 1934. It, therefore, follows that the time of filing in the
Supreme Court was within the rule.-Motion denied.
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS -

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW -

GASOLINE

STATION - Hollenbeck us. City and County of Denver - No.
13497-Decided September 16, 1935-Opinion by Mr. Justice
Holland.
Hollenbeck was fined $25.00 in the Municipal Court of Denver
for violation of City ordinance which provides that every gasoline filling station shall annually pay a license fee of $25.00 for one gasoline
dispenser and an additional annual fee of $10.00 for each additional
dispenser.
1. Ordinance No. 30, Series 1933, City and County of Denver,
is constitutional.
2. The existence of a gasoline filling station within the confines of a city imposes an additional burden both upon the Police
Department and the Fire Department, one as to traffic regulations and
one as to fire prevention, and necessarily increases the costs of such departments in the proper supervision.
3. It is immaterial whether the ordinance is a revenue measure
enacted under the guise of police regulation, for the city has power to
impose a license tax whether on the ground that it is a revenue measure
or a police regulation or for both purposes.--Judgment affirmed.
CONTRACTS--MEASURE OF DAMAGES-FIXING MEASURE BY CONTRACT-PLEADINC--SUFFICIENCY OF COMPLAINT - Midland

Oil & Refining Co. vs. HeatingService and Oil Co.-No. 13524-

Decided September 16, 193 5--Opinion by Mr. Justice Holland.
The Heating Company obtained a judgment below against The
Midland Oil Company for damages for breach of contract.
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1. Where it is apparent that the parties to a contract realized the
uncertainty of performance and made provision therefor, in that certain benefits were to inure to either party upon non-performance by the
other, in an action for damages for breach, they will be limited to the
very provisions they voluntarily adopted.
2. Where the complaint for damages is based upon failure to
deliver oil alone, disregarding the other portions of the contract, such
complaint fails to state a cause of action.
Plaintiff cannot select certain portions of a contract, bene3.
ficial to it, to the exclusion of other portions it had made and agreed
upon.--Judgment reversed.
Goff vs.
CONTRIBUTION BETWEEN PARTNERS Bergerman, et al.-No. 13341-Decided September 9, 1935Opinion by Mr. Justice Bouck.
Judgment for $2500 was rendered against Goff below on a claim
for contribution made by his partners for some debts they had to pay.
Defense was an agreement limiting contributions.
1. Contribution among partners, even where it might be proper,
will not be enforced until after a final accounting and settlement of the
partnership affairs.
2. An agreement between partners restricting the liability of one
to a certain amount is of no effect as to creditors without knowledge
of the limitation.
3. But partners as between themselves may limit the right to
contribution or may exclude it altogether.-Judgmentreversed.
PARTNERSHIP

RECORDING - DESCRIPTION - OWNERSHIP
CHATTEL MORTGAGES ESTOPPEL - INTEREST - Thomas vs. First National Bank of

Price-No. 13488-DecidedSeptember 9, 193 5--Opinion by Mr.
Justice Bouck.
Brown owned some 306 sheep, 283 of which were ear marked.
In 1930 they executed a chattel mortgage to Bank of Price, which
was duly recorded in Utah, but not in Colorado.
In 1932 the Swapp Company executed a chattel mortgage to the
Colorado bank of which Thomas was Conservator, which mortgage
was duly recorded in Colorado and covered some 1400 head of sheep,
and was alleged by Colorado bank to include those covered by Brown
mortgage. The Colorado bank seized all the sheep under its mortgage
and plaintiff instituted Replevin.
Held:
1. The Utah mortgage is valid even though not filed in Colorado; the owners of the property not having executed the second
mortgage and the Colorado bank not being in priority with the owner
or having brought itself within the class of third person or lien creditors
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protected by the Colorado statutes. There was no transfer in ownership from Brown to the Swapp Company.
2. The description in the Brown mortgage, even if it was defective, became immaterial if the Colorado bank was not legally in

position to attack it and was good between the parties.
3. Estoppel is not involved as there was no change in position

by the Colorado bank while relying on the conduct of the other party.

4.

There being no conflict in the evidence, the trial court cor-

rectly directed a verdict for plaintiff; defendant not having objected to
instructions granting interest, under these well known rules there can

be no review.

INHERITANCE TAX--OLD AGE PENSION-CONSTITUTIONAL LAWTAXATION-Estate of Hunter vs. State of Colorado, et al.-No.
13726-Decided September 9, 1935--Opinion by Mr. Justice
Holland.
The estate of Estelle Hunter was assessed an additional 10% inheritance tax to comply with 1933 Session Law for old age pension.
The constitutionality of the act was attacked on the following grounds:
Colorado Constitution
(a)
Article X, Sec. 7 (For County purpose)
(b)
Article X, Sec. 3 (Uniformity of taxation)
(c) Article X, Sec. 25 (Local or special laws)
Federal Constitution
(d)
Fourteenth Amendment (Equal protection)
(e) Fourteenth Amendment (Due process) and
Article 11, Sec. 25 Colorado Constitution
Colorado Constitution
(f)
Article V, Sec. 21 (One subject legislation)
(g)
Article V, Sec. 24 (Re-enactment of existing statutes,
by reference)
The act was further attacked on the ground that the 10% assessment
was on the full amount of the tax and not the amount payable if paid
within the six months, and on the further ground that the act imposes
a new tax.
Held: The legislature has a right to declare what is or what is
not a county purpose and can constitute the Board of County Commissioners its agents for distribution. The act does not impose a new tax
and is definitely anchored to the inheritance tax act by reference expressed in the title. The tax is uniform on all of the same class and is
applicable alike.
The act is constitutional.
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WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION -

ATTORNEY AND CLIENT -

UNDER

WHAT CONDITIONS AN ATTORNEY IS ENTITLED TO COMPENSATION FOR INJURIES--O. P. Skaggs Co. et al. vs. Nixon--No.

13675-Decided September 9, 1935--Opinion by Mr. Justice
Young.
John C. Nixon, an attorney, under a monthly retainer by 0. P.
Skaggs Co., was injured in an automobile accident while driving from

Denver to his home at Greeley, the trip caused by his coming to Denver,
Colorado, to attend to business for his client. The Industrial Commission declined his claim for compensation on the ground that he was
not an employe of 0. P. Skaggs Co. within the meaning of the Work-

men's Compensation Act. On appeal to the District Court the District Court set aside the order of the Commission and found that
Nixon was an employe of the Skaggs Co. The question of employment was the only issue before the Court.
1. There was competent evidence to support the finding of the
District Court that Nixon was an employe of the Skaggs Co. and that
such evidence was uncontroverted.
2. Therefore, the finding of the Commission that he was not
such employe acted in excess of its powers.
3. The District Court did not substitute its own findings of
fact for those of the Commission for the Commission found the existence of a negative condition, that is, non-employment, and when the
Court found there was competent evidence of employment and that
it was uncontroverted, the Court was passing on questions of law and
not making a finding of fact.
4. The Commission failed to make findings of fact on any question except that of non-employment. Therefore, the case should be
remanded to the Commission to make the further statutory findings,
that is, as to whether or not the claimant was performing services arising out of and in the course of his employment and as to whether or not
the injury was proximately caused by accident arising out of or in the
course of his employment.--Judgment affirmed as to the order of the
District Court finding that the uncontroverted evidence established the
relationship of employer and employe and with directions to remand
the case to the Commission for the purpose of determining the other
questions.
EVIDENCE--CREDIBILITY OF WITNESSES-Thomas Edgar Kidd vs.
People of State of Colorado-No. 13788-Decided September 30,
19 3 5--Opinion by Mr. Chief Justice Butler.
1.
Plaintiff in error was convicted of receiving stolen goods.
Part of the evidence was obtained by means of a dictograph on admis-

sion of which evidence plaintiff appeals.
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2. Rules of evidence permit admission of evidence obtained by
use of dictograph when the party testifying can establish his familiarity
with the voice of the accused.
3. Rules of evidence also require admission of evidence tending
to disprove credibility of accusing witness. Exclusion of such evidence
cannot be other than prejudicial, considering the nature of evidence produced against plaintiff in error.-Reversedand remanded for new trial.
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS-CITY ATTORNEY-MEASURE OF COMPENSATION-Kinzie us. The Incorporated Town of Haxtun-

No. 13795-Decided October 7, 1935-Opinion by Mr. Justice
Young.
Plaintiff brought suit below to recover judgment against a municipal corporation for services as attorney.
1. Section 9064, C. L. 1921, among other things, provides:
"The Board of Trustees shall appoint a town attorney * * *
shall prescribe their duties and compensation or the fees they shall be
entitled to receive * * *"
2.
From the foregoing it was evident that it was the legislative
intent that the Board of Trustees of a town should fix and determine
the character of the services to be rendered and the compensation to be
paid to one appointed as an attorney for an incorporated town.
3.
It was the duty of the trial court to determine the scope of
plaintiff's duties as attorney under his original contract of employment.
If the duties performed were within the requirements of the original
contract it is not probable that the Board of Trustees would have offered additional compensation for the rendition of services required to
If they were not within the terms of the
be performed thereunder.
original contract then it was for the District Court to so determine.Judgment reversed and cause remanded for further proceedings in the
District Court.
PROHIBITION-

NON-RESIDENT CORPORATION -

JURISDICTION OF

COURT OVER CORPORATE STOCK-People vs. District CourtNo. 13809-Decided Oct. 7, 1935-Opinion by Mr. Justice
Bouck.
On petition of the Edinburg State Bank and Trust Co., a Texas
corporation, for a writ of prohibition, a rule to show cause was entered
in this court directed against the District Court, Routt county.
Houston purchased certain lands and water rights at foreclosure
sale. The water rights consisted in part of stock in the Still-Water
Ditch and Reservoir Co., a Colorado corporation.
In an action commenced by Houston he charged that the certificates of stock so claimed have been fraudulently disposed of by delivery
to the Texas bank and that the Still-Water Co. refuses to recognize
his ownership of the stock.
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1. Service of summons on non-resident corporation is insufficient
to subject the latter to jurisdiction over its person.
2. However, when the cause of action is in rem, the District
Court has jurisdiction over the property, that is, the stock certificates
which have their situs in Colorado and may lawfully proceed with reference to it so long as it avoids entering a personal judgment against a
non-resident defendant.-Rule discharged and petition for writ of prohibition denied.
PUBLIC

UTILITIES-POWER

COMPANIES-WHAT

CONSTITUTES-

Colorado Utilities Corporation vs. The Public Utilities Commission et al.-No. 1348 1--Opinion by Mr. Justice Bouck-Decided
September 30, 1395.
The Moffat Coal Company and the town of Oak Creek, Colorado, entered into a contract whereby the company was to supply an
electric current and the town was to distribute it to its inhabitants. The
town paid the company a flat per kilowatt rate. The inhabitants of the
town formerly obtained their electric power from the Colorado Utilities Corporation, the plaintiff here. The action brought before the
Utilities Commission was dismissed, the Commission ruling that the
company was not a public utility within the contemplation of the statute. Upon appeal to the District Court the holding of the Commission
was affirmed. Error was alleged.
I. It is impossible to contract away a statute. The mere fact that
the contract between the town and the company provided that the company was not a utility did not make it so. The facts control.
I.
Section 2913, C. L. '21, defines a utility as "The term 'public
utility' when used in this act, includes every * * * electrical company * * * operating for the purpose of supplying the public for
domestic, mechanical or public uses * * *." An arrangement to sell
for public uses is of itself sufficient to constitute the seller a public utility.
"It is no answer to the question before us to say that the company's sale
is to the town as a single individual customer only." If a municipality
desires to place itself beyond the control of the Utilities Commission, it
must produce as well as distribute electric current.--Judgment retwsed
with directions.
MORTGAGES--CONSTRUCTION OF CONTRACT-COVENANTS OF WAR-

Oil Company of Wyoming us.
Rector-No. 13292-Decided September 30, 1935--Opinion by
Mr. Justice Hilliard.
The Rectors executed to plaintiff's remote assignor a note secured
by deed of trust which was foreclosed as a mortgage in the court below.
It contained the following: "This deed of trust is subject to a certain
oil lease," etc., the said lease having been made between the same parties
at a prior date. There were several extensions made as to the maturity
RANTY-PAYMENT-Associated
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of the note and the period of the lease. The last extension was to
August 1. 1928, when an abandonment under the lease occurred by
reason of the failure to commence a well. Defendants contended that
the lease created an estate for twenty years and that the obligation to
pay rent continued until the lessee reconveyed to the defendants by
reason of which they are entitled to certain credits on the note and further that the trust deed should be reformed to create an exception as to
the oil and gas rights.
1. The parties treated the lease as having, in the absence of extensions, a definite limitation. The defendants are bound by their agreed
construction of the lease.
2. The deed of trust contained covenants of warranty and conveyed the fee title and necessarily carried with it any oil and gas rights
not covered by the lease, and the reversion of the lease.
3. A set-off or counterclaim does not amount to payment, since
there has been no delivery of money by the debtor to the creditor.Judgment reversed.
LIFE INSURANCE-CHANGE OF BENEFICIARY-BENEFICIARY NOT
THE LAWFUL HUSBAND OF INSURED-Moore vs. Metropolitan
Life Insurance Co. et al.-No. 13703-Decided August 19, 1935
-- Opinion by Mr. Justice Bouck.
A life insurance policy was issued to Cornelia White prior to her
marriage to plaintiff below, which contained a provision making the
policy payable to the executor or administrator in case of death. After
her marriage, by proper endorsement, she designated Thomas Moore,
husband, the plaintiff below, as beneficiary. Contest below was principally between the husband and the administrator as to who was entitled to the death benefit. The court below awarded it to the administrator.
1. Under the policy the insured had the right to change the beneficiary and had the right to substitute Thomas Moore, husband, as
beneficiary, in place of the executor or administrator, and complied with
all terms of the policy in so doing.
2. Where it appears that the changed beneficiary was not the
lawful husband of the insured by reason of the fact that the insured
had not obtained a divorce from a former husband, nevertheless, the
change in beneficiary to the plaintiff was legal because the title of husband added to his name in the endorsement was a mere matter of
description. The insured was not limited in her choice of beneficiary to
any particular class or classes.
She had the right to select whomever she desired to benefit regardless of any supposed absence of an insurable interest on the part of the
beneficiary, where there was nothing in the pleadings or evidence to
suggest any restriction of that choice.--Judgment reversed.
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RAPE-EVIDENCE

OF

SEPARATE

CRIME-HEARSAY-CORROBORA-

TION--Granato vs. The People-No. 13756-Decided August
12, 1935--Opinion by Mr. Chief Justice Butler.
Granato was convicted of the crime of statutory rape in the court
below.
1. Where evidence is admitted tending to prove the commission
of a separate crime than that charged but such evidence is an inseparable
part of the entire transaction leading to the commission of the crime
charged, it is not error to admit the same.
2. Where prosecutrix made statements to defendant's relatives
that defendant had not harmed her in any way or mistreated her, and
relying on this statement such relatives had a right to ask prosecutrix
to tell defendant's lawyer the truth and stop the prosecution and where
thereafter in the trial prosecutrix was permitted to testify that the relatives wanted her to go to defendant's lawyer and tell him that nothing
had happened, such evidence, though hearsay and made out of the
presence of the defendant, was not prejudicial.
3. In a rape case, an instruction that the evidence of a prompt
and early complaint of the wrong by prosecutrix may be considered in
corroboration of her other testimony is proper.--Judgment affirmed.
JUDGMENTS-VERDICTS--VERDICT FOR PLAINTIFF-VERDICT FOR
DEFENDANT-RECONCILING VERDICTS--Creek vs. Lebo Invest-

ment Co.-No. 13438-Decided August 19, 1935--Opinion by
Mr. Chief Justice Butler.
Creek, who was the defendant below, seeks the reversal of a judgment rendered against her in an action brought by Lebo Investment
Company to recover rent.
There have been three trials. The judgment rendered against the
defendant in the first trial was reversed. At the second trial the jury
rendered two separate verdicts, one in favor of the plaintiff for
$5,648.20 and another in favor of the defendant on defendant's crosscomplaint, for $8,437.50. A motion for new trial was granted on the
counterclaim only.
At the third trial verdict was entered and judgment entered thereon
for $6,650.00 in favor of the defendant on a counterclaim.
1. Where the jury at the second trial found two separate verdicts,
one in favor of the plaintiff upon which judgment had already been
rendered, and the other in favor of the defendant on her counterclaim,
and the defendant did not seek to have the verdict and judgment against
her set aside, and where the plaintiff sought and obtained a new trial on
the counterclaim only and the verdict and judgment in plaintiff's favor
was permitted to stand, then there existed two verdicts upon which
separate judgments had been rendered and it was permissible for the
court to deduct the lesser judgment from the greater and render a corrected judgment for the difference.--Judgment affirmed.

